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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [
the judicial hierarchy, being the decision of a municipal court. Thus, in
the remaining 33 cities whose health codes empower entrance without a
warrant to inspect for violations,4 7 it seems well settled that as long as
the actions of the inspector are "reasonable" within themselves, they
will be allowed. Any future denial of such a right to inspection under
the state police power would have to be based upon the unreasonable
actions of the inspecting officer while operating under the provisions of
the various ordinances.
The problem of keeping large cities and their inhabitants free from
disease and epidemic is indeed a serious task facing all municipal govern-
ments. Under the authority of the decisioni in the instant case, that task
has been considerably eased and the way facilitated for the institution of
practical inspection machinery to aid health officials." The Court went to
great lengths in this opinion to keep its holding as narrow as possible
and yet still effectively support its conclusion with the law. The sometimes
entangled and perhaps seemingly superfluous decision rendered by the
majority may well be criticized by some for its lack of clarity, yet it
cannot be denied that the Court has accomplished its goal effectively.
With a minimum loss of personal rights, those being the rights to absolute
inviolability of a man's "castle," the Court has precariously tightroped
the fine lines of search and seizure and due process, and still reaches a
reasonable result. Cities need the unencumbered right to make inspections
for the purpose of discovering substandard health conditions, and this
case has rightly granted it to them.
SAMUEL S. SMnTH
EVIDENCE -AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS AND
THE "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE"
Plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries suffered in an automobile
collision in which he was the sole survivor. The trial court construed the
"Dead Man's Statute" to prohibit the plaintiff from testifying as to the
facts of the accident and directed a verdict for the defendant-executor.
Held, reversed: an automobile accident is not a "transaction" within the
47. The health codes of 57 cities were studied by the Urban Renewal Admin-
istration and out of these, 36 empowered officers to inspect without a warrant. See 3
URBAN RENEWAL BuL.L. (1956).
48. It has been argued that rather than allow these warrantless searches, a special
type of warrant should be provided for. However as recognized by Mr. justice Frank-
ftrrter, to set tip "a loose basis for granting a search warrant for the situation before
us is to enter by way of the back door to a recognition of the fact that by reason of
its intrinsic elements . . . such a search . . . does not offend the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,373 (1959).
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meaning of the "Dead Man's Statute." Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559
(Fla. App. 1959).
The common law rule that parties to an action were incompetent to
testify was based on the premise that no interested person would testify
truthfully; thus all testimony by the parties was excluded.' In every jurisdic-
tion in the United States this disqualification has been removed by statute;
however, in most states an exception has been made in the case of an action
against a decedent. Generally these "Dead Man's Statutes" exclude from
admissability the testimony of a surviving party in an action against the
decedent's estate.2 These statutes are not uniform in language in that
some prohibit testimony by a party relating to a "transaction or occurence"
with a decedent, while others prohibit such testimony only if the transaction
is a "personal" one. A few statutes prohibit the plaintiff from testifying
in a matter constituting a "claim or demand" upon the estate.-, Notwith-
standing minor variations in statutory language, the American decisions
are in conflict as to whether an automobile accident is a "transaction"
within the meaning of the "Dead Man's Statute."
Most jurisdictions regard an automobile accident as a "transaction," 4
defining the term as "every variety of affairs which can form the subject
of negotiations, interviews or actions between two persons. . . ."I By this
definition no distinction is drawn between actions of contract and tort.6
A liberal construction of the statute is favored7 in order to carry out its
intended purpose, i.e. maintaining equality in the presentation of evidence.8
I. I GILBERT, EVIDENcF 220 (Lofft's ed. 1795).
2. 2 WIOMORE, EVIDENcr § 578 at 695 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940): "the jurisdictions not
recognizing this disqualification are half-a-dozen only"; 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 216(1948); See Wahl, Rex Beach, Dr. Brown and the Dead Man's Statute, 15 FLA. L.J. 236.
3. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROCEDURE § 1880(3) (1953) with NEB. REV. STAT.§ 25.1201 (1956) and Wis. STAT. § 325.16 (1957).
4. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F. 2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1946) (applying Pa. law); Miller
v. DuBois, 153 Cal. App. 23, 314 P.2d 27 (1957); Schampon v. Speis, 258 I1. App. 23,
1 N.E.2d 499 (1936); Miller v. Walsh's Adm'x., 207 Ky. 779, 43 S.W.2d 42 (1931);
Cross v. Frost, 227 Miss. 455, 86 So. 2d 296 (1956); in re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb.
376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958); Tallman v. First Nat'l Bank of Nevada, 66 Nev. 248,
208 P.2d 306 (1949); Boyd v. Williams, 207 N.C. 30, 175 S.E. 833 (1934); Panhandle
& Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellinson,-Tex.-, 326 S.W.2d 38 (1959); Strode v. Dyer, 115
W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934); Stephans v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 285 Pac. 797
(1930. In re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 383, 89 N.W.2d 137,142 (1958);
Stephans v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 332, 285 Pac. 797, 798 (1930). Compare Strode v.
Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878, 879 (1934): "iTransaction meant is] an action
participated in by witness and decedent, or something done in decedent's presence, to
which, if alive, he could testify of his own personal knowledge." The dissenting judge
stated however, "I think that those courts which have included within the term
'transaction' all sorts of chance happenings have gone beyond the plain signification of
the word and have given a strained meaning to the statute, with the result that what
was designed to prevent certain evils has been made to foster others." Strode v. Dyer,
supra at 740, 177 S.E. at 881.
6. Iallowach v. Priest, 113 Me. 510, 95 At]. 146 (1915).
7. Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934); State ex rel. Bryant v.
Morris, 69 N.C. 444, 448 (1873): "While the objection to the evidence is not within
the letter, it is within the spirit of the statute."
8. Cross v. Frost. 227 Miss. 455, 86 So.2d 296 (1956).
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le decedent's estate is protected from fraudulent claims by excluding all of
the survivor's testimony; "death having silenced the one, the law silences
the other." 9 The Georgia courts alone permit the surviving witness to
testify to his own actions but exclude testimony relating to acts of the
decedent. 10  This distinction has been strongly condemned by other
jurisdictions."
A more liberal position is taken by a minority of states which give
a rdstricted interpretation to the statutes and hold that all testimony is
admissable unless clearly excluded by the statute; 2 when doubt exists
such testimony is to be admitted. 13 It is apparent from the decisions that
these jurisdictions view the hearing of all the evidence of greater importance
than the protection of decedents' estates from fraudulent claims, and
leave to the jury the determination of the facts after all evidence is
presented.
Prior to the instant case the Florida courts had not determined
whether an automobile accident was a "transaction" within the prohibition
of the Florida statute.14 In Kilmer v. Gustafson, in which the Florida
statute was applied, a surviving driver was allowed to testify as to his
actions but not as to those of the decedent defendant.'" This case was
later followed by the Florida Supreme Court in permitting a defendant
driver to testify as to his actions in a suit for personal injuries brought
by the representative of a mentally incompetent passenger. 6 In the instant
case the court discussed all the arguments advanced both for and against
9. Newman v. Tipton, 191 Tenn. 461, 465, 234 S.W.2d 984, 996 (1950);
T1alman v. First Nat'i Bank of Nevada, 66 Nev. 248, 208 P.2d 306 (1949).
10. U.S.A.C. Transp. Inc. v. Corley, 202 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953); Rogers v.
Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 343, 198 S.F. 318 (1938).
It. In re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 386, 89 N.W.2d 137, 144 (1958):
"\Ve can see no logical reason for such a holding, for if the factual situation brings it
within the statute, then the statute necessarily excludes all of the testimony relating
thereto."
12. Gibson v. McDonald, 265 Ala. 426, 91 So.2d 679 (1957); Rankin v. Morgan,
193 Ark. 751, 102 S.WV.2d 552 (1937); Turbot v. Rcpp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565
(1955); Shaneybroulk v. Blizard, 209 Md. 304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956); Christofel v.
Johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956); Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis.
249, 248 N.\,V. 155 (1933). An automobile ,.-cident is a fortuitous and involuntary event,
Shancybrook v. Ilizard, supra. Testirnony relating the facts of the accident is considered
the history of the event, the unilateral observations of the survivor and thus admissible,
Christofel v. Johnson, supra. While these courts do not define "transaction" they state
that it involves mutuality and concert of action, Krantz v. Krantz, supra.
13. Newman v. Tipton, 191 Tenn. 461 465, 234 S.V.2d 994, 996 (1950): "This
statute cannot be extended by the courts in cases not within its tens . . . Illt must be
strictly construed as against the exclusion of the testimony and in favor of its admsission."
14, I"LA. STAT. § 90.05 (1957) provides: "no party . .. nor any person interested ...
shall be examined as a witness in regard to any transaction or conuossnication between
such witness and a person at the time of such examination deceased ... "
15. 211 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 1954): "'.he trial court had carefully excluded
all testimony by the plaintiff pertaining to the decedent's car and its novements, even
to the extent of forbidding plaintiff to testify that there was in fact a collision." In
reaching this holding the court relied heavily upon and adopted the Georgia view as
expressed in U.S.A.G. Trausp. Inc., v. Corlev, 202 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953).
16. Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1954).
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the admittance of the surviving witnesses' testimony. In adopting the more
modern and liberal minority rule which allows such testimony into evidence
the court said:
Here we have a guest in an automobile, who is completely inactive
as to the controls of the automobile in which he is riding, who
in no way mutually participates in the ensuing collision, and who
is merely the unfortunate victim of the actions of others which
actions he observes as independent facts and not as part of a
transaction between the decedent driver and himself.'7
The holding in the instant case removes this state from the limbo
of its prior intermediate position' 8 and expressly adopts the more liberal
minority view.
It is submitted that the result in the instant case is both proper and
desirable. The exclusion of a survivor's testimony has been uniformly
condemned by a great majority of the modem writers on the law of
evidence' as a rule "unfounded in reason . . . which leads to more
false decisions than it prevents and encumbers the profession with a profuse
mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words. ' 20 The
rule has been strongly condemned by the very courts which enforce it,
such courts holding themselves bound to do so until the legislature repeals
the statute.21 If a court can construe a statute so as to exclude evidence,
surely it is within the judicial power to construe the same statute to admit
such evidence.
RiCHAMRn E. RECKSON
ADMIRALTY - FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A Spanish seaman injured aboard a ship on which he was a crew
member, brought an action for personal injuries on the law side of a
United States District Court against four separate corporate defendants.
The claims against the vessel's Spanish owners and their agents, a New
17. Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559, 563 (Fla. App. 1959).
18. Kilmer v. Gustafson, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954); Herring v. Eiland, 81
So.2d 645 (Fla. 1954).
19. 2 \VIcNIoRU, EviDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940); Report of the Legal Research
Committee of the Commonwealth Fund cited in 2 ,WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE, Supra; MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 92 (1942); 5 CHEAMTIERNYE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 3670 (1916).
20. 2 WIGNIORE, EvIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
21. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1946): "We reach the result
without enthusiasm. The rule excluding a survivor's testimony seems to stand in the
almost unique situation of being condemned by all of the modeni writers on the law
of evidence. It is said to be as unsound and undesirable as the rule excluding the
testimony of parties of which the survivor rule is a part. But we believe this to be a
case where a rule so thoroughly established through many generations of judicial history
should be removed by legislative action or .court rule which applies generally and not by
judicial legislation against a party in a particular case."
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